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Recent Developments

Hayes v. State
Substitution of an Alternate Juror May Be Done at any Time before the Jury
Closes the Jury Room Door to Begin Deliberations
By Jennifer Golub

I

n a case of first impression,
the Court of Appeals of
Maryland recently considered the
meaning ofthe phrase "when the jury
retires to consider its verdict" from
Md. Rule 4-312(b)(3), and how it
applies to substituting an alternate
juror. The court of appeals found the
rule's intention to be that the
substitution of an alternate juror is
impermissible after the jury has left the
courtroom to consider its verdict and
has closed the jury room door for
deliberations. Hayes v. State, 355
Md. 615, 735 A.2d 1109 (1999).
The court declared that closing the jury
room door marks the point at which
the ability to substitute a juror ends.
Following closing arguments
and jury instructions in the trial ofJohn
Hayes ("Hayes"), Judge Kahl of the
Circuit Court for Baltimore County
thanked and excused the alternate
juror. The judge directed the
remaining jurors to retire to the jury
room and begin deliberations. Soon
thereafter, the judge called Hayes
back into the courtroom and told him
that one of the jurors became ill as
soon as the jury had left to begin
deliberations. The judge notified
Hayes that because he felt actual jury
deliberations had not yet begun, he
would substitute the sick juror with the
excused alternate juror who had not
yet left the building. Defense counsel
objected.

The jury convicted Hayes of
robbery and various handgun charges
and sentenced him to twenty-five
years in prison. Hayes appealed to
the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland, which affirmed the circuit
court's holding. Hayes then appealed
to the Court of Appeals ofMaryland,
which reversed the intermediate
appellate court's decision.
The major issue before the court
of appeals was at what point in a trial
does the jury "retire to consider its
verdict," pursuant to Maryland Rule
4-312(b)(3). Hayes, 355 Md. at
620, 735 A.2d at 1111. The court
highlighted Rule 4-312(b)(3) as the
current law dealing with alternate
jurors in criminal cases. [d. at 621,
735 A.2d at 1112 (citing Md. Rule
4-312(b)(3)). In capital cases, the
court noted, the rule provides for two
alternate jurors, subject to restrictions
ofthe jUdge. [d. Furthermore, the
rule provides that an alternate cannot
be substituted during actual
deliberations or sentencing. [d. In
non-capital cases, an alternate who
does not replace a juror shall be
discharged "when the jury retires to
consider its verdict." [d. (citing Md.
Rule 4-312(b)(3)).
Because the court had not
previously considered the meaning of
the phrase "when the jury retires to
consider its verdict," nor had the court
ever determined the effect of a

violation of the rule, the court turned
to both state and federal case law of
other jurisdictions which have dealt
with the issue oftiming and violations
regarding the substitution of an
alternate juror. [d. at 622-23, 735
A.2d at 1112-13. In so doing, the
court analyzed two categories of
cases: (1) cases where the
substitution was made before the
beginning of deliberations; and (2)
cases where the substitution was
made after the commencement of
deliberations. [d. In the former
situation, most courts have upheld the
substitution pnor to the
commencement ofdeliberations, and
in the latter, courts have been mixed
in their holdings. ld.
The court examined Rule 24(c)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure ("FRCP") which allows,
foregoing its amendment in April of
1999, substitution "prior to" the time
the jury retires. [d. However, the
court observed that in practice, this
rule has been applied beyond its
limitations. [d. The court then
focused on the most recent changes
to FRCP 24(c). Id. at 625, 735
A.2dat 1114. The Supreme Court's
April, 1999 amendment to FRCP
24(c) became effective December 1,
1999, and the rule now allows
substitution of alternates after
deliberations have begun. ld. The
new provision states that "when the
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jury retires to consider the verdict, the
court, in its discretion, may retain the
alternate jurors during deliberations."
Id. (quoting Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
119 S. Ct. Ct. R-5, 8 (1999)). The
rule now indicates, however, that ifan
alternate replaces an impaneled juror
after deliberations have begun, the jury
should be instructed to begin new
deliberations. Id. The court
acknowledged that the change to Rule
24(c) allows the federal courts to
continue a practice already in
existence. Id. at 626, 735 A.2d at
1115.
The court of appeals also
discussed various cases which
address the meaning of the current
language of Rule 24(c). Id. at 62634, 735 A.2d at 1115-20. The
federal cases cited by the court show
that, prior to the amendment, federal
courts allowed jurors to be substituted
after the start of deliberations,
concluding that substantial rights were
not violated. Id. The court noted that
federal cases also suggested that it was
permissible to recall an alternate juror
who had been discharged. Id. at 632,
735 A.2d at 1118. The court
recognized that other decisions have
been upheld by the use ofthe harmless
error doctrine. Id. at 634, 735 A.2d
at 1119.
The court of appeals stated that
they could not change the language of
Rule 4-312(b)(3), nor could they
"circumvent the rule through an
expansive harmless error or
presumptive non-prejudice doctrine
that is entirely foreign to our
jurisprudence." Id. at 635,735 A.2d
at 1119-20. Any change in the rule,
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the court held, must come from the
legislature. Id. at 635, 735 A.2d at
1120.
In the instant case, the court of
appeals concluded that an alternate
juror may be substituted for a regular
juror until such a time as the jUlY enters
the jury room to consider its verdict,
and closes the door if (1 )the alternate
juror remained qualified, and (2) the
regular juror is properly discharged.
Id. The closing ofthe door, however,
is the point at which any ability to
substitute ends because, up until that
point, the defendant is not prejUdiced
as the jury has not discussed the case
and the alternate juror has not been
subjected to outside influences. Id.
at 636, 735 A.2d at 1120.
The court defended its holding
as a practical standard which
addresses time lapses between
closing arguments and deliberations,
and promotes simplicity and fairness
in administration. Id. The court
opined that the rule, as set forth, will
lead to easy compliance, and moots
the issue as to what happened after
the door closed. Id. The exact time
the door closed, the court stated,
could be established through objective
and extrinsic evidence. Id. The court
also added that the time the door
closed should be made a matter of
record. Id. at 637, 735 A.2d at 1120.
Through its ruling, the court rendered
moot another issue raised by Hayes,
that a discharged alternate may not
be recalled, because jurors should
remain qualified until substitution is no
longer allowed, or until the door
closes. Id. at 637,735 A.2d at 1121.
The court applied its holding to
the petitioner's case, and found that

Hayes did preserve his complaint
regarding the substitution. Id. The
court remanded the case back to the
Circuit Court for Baltimore County to
determine how it was concluded that
deliberations had not yet begun. Id.
at 638,735 A.3d at 1121. There was
nothing on the record to make that
issue clear to the court of appeals, nor
was there any evidence shown that
there was any examination of the
dismissed alternate to determine
whether he was subjected to any
outside influences. Id.
In Hayes, the Court of Appeals
ofMaryland declined to follow federal
practice. Accordingly, Maryland law
is now distinctively different from
federal law with regard to the
substitution of alternate jurors. It is
important for Maryland practitioners
to recognize this distinction so that
they may tailor their litigation to
comply with the correct interpretation
of the rule which applies in their
respective situations. The court also
sets forth a bright line test in a case of
first impression and provides that, in
Maryland, deliberations commence
when the jury room door shuts and
the time the door shuts should be made
part of the record.

